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The bodiless Shadow: Towards a Meta-Medial Framework

Marc Boumeester


This essay seeks to unlock alternative perspectives on the practice of theory and/or the theory of practice through the construction of a meta-medial framework based on agency-scapes (a concept I will expand below). The scope of this piece of research is defined by the relation between medium, desire and affect, and the inquiry will be directed towards the exploration of the role of media in the interplay between what was formerly known as perception, and the independent force of desire, which renders the anthropocentric hegemony of will obsolete. The central question in this essay is: what is the affective capacity of a medium like architecture? How can architectural conditions – regarded on their merits as media – express an independent desire through agency, and following on from this, how can we – as designers – bond to this realm of non-anthropocentric agency to enrich our own design driven abstractions? Within this framework the specific role or use of media is the central topic under investigation, but even more importantly I aim to expose meta-media as a manifestation of agency. To this end I will first sketch a theoretical position, addressing the Affective Turn and New Materialism, before briefly describing a series of design studios in which the expressed objective was to explore the affective capacity of media, and the possibilities inherent in blurring the boundary between the tangible and the affective. Throughout I draw from the fields of media theory and design philosophy to introduce various conceptual parameters. In particular I will adapt a model used by social-cultural anthropologist Arjun Appadurai to create a specific mental framework. In so doing I highlight a premise running through this paper: that what I am looking for in and through this inquiry will not be directly visible; instead that which I seek always needs something upon which to cast a shadow, a shadow through which we might infer presence. To embody this abstract notion I draw here upon a lecture delivered by Nat Chard at the Plenitude & Emptiness symposium in Edinburgh where he showed a stereoscopic image in which a shift of camera-angle had caused an object to ‘disappear’ but its to shadow remain.^[01] This residual form perfectly exemplified the concept that I will go on to describe below: the shadow without a body.

The ‘Affective Turn’ and New Materialism: Thinking ‘Agency’

Originating in Deleuzian scholarship, this research departs from an area currently referred to as the Affective Turn. Affect theory is a way of understanding domains of experience that fall outside (or refuse to fall within) the prevailing paradigm of representation. These experiences are seen as coextensive with our mental and bodily experiences, but are irreducible to them and as such do not depend on any signifying instrument. Affects cause auto-responses of the body and thus circumvent consciousness; experience is never of something, but rather is something, and as such is irreducible to what we call lived experience. As radical empiricist Brian Massumi argues:

Thought lags behind itself. It can never catch up with its own beginnings. The half-second of thought-forming is forever lost in darkness. All awareness emerges from a nonconscious thought-o-genic lapse indistinguishable from movements of matter.^[02]

Affect is therefore embodied, and, Massumi argues, any theory of media or culture must both take affect into account and, at the same time, abandon the structuralist signifier in order to give way to an “asignifying philosophy of affect.”^[03]

This discourse on affect is now an intrinsic part of research into contemporary political, cultural and economic transformations, as well as into their ramifications in the social domain. Media theorist Michael Hardt summarises:

The challenge of the perspective of the affects resides primarily in the synthesis it requires. This is, in the first place, because affects refer equally to the body and the mind; and, in the second, because they involve both reason and the passions. Affects require us, as the term suggests, to enter the realm of causality, but they offer a complex view of causality because the affects belong simultaneously to both sides of the causal relationship. They illuminate, in other words, both our power to affect the world around us and our power to be affected by it, along with the relationship between these two powers.^[04]

The Affective Turn can be situated under the broader post-post-structuralist and radical empiricist Ontological Turn. Within this turn New Materialism, as it has come to be known, advocates the conceptualization of interchange and fluctuation between the realms of nature and culture (dismantling or ‘deterritorializing’ former distinctions between these realms).^[05] This conceptualization results in an argument that states that nature and culture are always already “naturecultures,” and that the mind is, therefore, always already material.^[06] In this construct the mind is an idea of the body and matter is unavoidably something of the mind – the mind has the body as its object.

New Materialism therefore opposes those preternatural and humanist traditions in cultural theory that are based on dualist structures, and offers an enticing alternative by opening up theory formations in which matter is a strong actor. This has important implications for thinking agency (the capacity to affect); it shifts the prerogative on agency from the anthropocentric to the shared domain (matter, medium, mind, body).^[07] The feminist philosopher Karen Barad elaborates:

Agency for me is not something that someone or something has to varying degrees, since I am trying to displace the very notion of independently existing individuals. This is not, however, to deny agency in its importance, but on the contrary, to rework the notion of agency in ways that are appropriate to relational ontologies. Agency is not held, it is not a property of persons or things; rather, agency is an enactment, a matter of possibilities for reconfiguring entanglements.^[08]

Under the lead of this New Materialist thought (New Materialism), and as a result of this shifting thinking on agency, matter is re-thought; matter is rapidly losing its characteristic passivity. In this thinking matter is slowly freed from its inability to express and to act upon desires. Simultaneously, therefore, desires might emerge unconsciously, independent of the spirit and resistant to the will of the mind. Matter, acting in very physical ways, thus takes on a remarkable autonomous agency, or what political theorist Jane Bennett refers to as: “the capacity of things – edibles, commodities, storms, metals – not only to impede or block the will and designs of humans but also to act as quasi agents or forces with trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of their own.”^[09] In this light we could ask ourselves in what way the (un-conscious) body expresses desires as the expression its own desires, rather than desires of the mind. Desire here – non-representational, not obedient to the mind, non-essential and unhindered by conscious intervention – interacts and is induced by matter in a most immediate way; matter becomes affective.

Crucially matter, in this context, needs to be seen as social; it is not about the individual but about tendencies. The ‘collaboration’ between the human (and technological) and matter is predominantly seen through the lenses of anthropocentrism and the hylomorphist tenure, causing developments in thinking on the subject to take a narrow and singular path. To speak with political and social theorist Diana Coole:

It is this chiasm – between touching and touched, activity and passivity, phenomenal and objective being - that grants the body its capacity for “double sensation” and which opens it onto a world or, to express it more ontologically, this is Being, flesh, existence, opening itself to contingency, meaning, and self-transformation; a hollowing out whereby interiority, dimensionality, and productive differentiation occur.^[10]

Central to the argument I am developing here, and counter to hylomorphist thinking, is the premise that the virtual and the actual are both seen as being reality, and that there is nothing beyond this reality. The only way to describe any situation is to become that situation; any attempt to represent something will only lead to a new situation and thus tell us little about the original. Research needs to be aided by cases and concepts – both virtual and actualized – and not by representations. Research through design seems to be a vital instrument to support this conviction.

The ‘Grey Mouse’: Description by Proxy

With this conceptual territory sketched out, let us turn to the question of agency (the ability to affect), and crucially the question of agency as it relates to (the use of) media. I will, for the time being, refer to the object (I use the term with care here) of the notional research described here as ‘The Grey Mouse’; like the grey mouse its appearance can only be determined through its relation to its surroundings. The grey mouse is thus a placeholder for a variety of research topics. Taking Arjun Appadurai’s five categories (which he calls “deeply perspectival constructs, inflected very much by the historical, linguistic and political situatedness of different sorts of actors”)^[11] as a starting point we might locate this elusive research object in relation to the current discourse on New Materialism described in the preceding section of this essay. In order to do so I propose to convert Appadurai’s ‘scapes’ into four categories, distinguishing between ethoscape (affect), ideoscape (concept), mediascape (form of expression) and technoscape (form of content). The grey mouse is located in the middle of our chart of revised ‘scapes’, between affect, concept, expression and content.

Crucially, this adjustment of Appadurai’s terms is not simply a refinement of the originary statements, nor is it a transgression of any sort. Rather it is an attempt to locate research that responds directly to Appadurai’s meta-construct itself, which allows – almost provokes – adaptation, indigenization and appropriation. In the construction of these four ‘scapologies’ Appadurai departs from the multitude of recognized, seemingly open-ended presuppositions that condition discourse. For instance, he identifies multicore rather than singular power structures (like authority, technology and ethnicity itself), thus permitting continuous shifting power balances, he isolates agency (as an instrument) allowing for a diversity of experience within and beyond its context, and he sees identity or citizenship as an (temporary) outcome of intersecting ‘scapes’ rather than as a presumed given. These differentiations do not arise from the simple subdivision of existing categories into ‘scapes’, but rather from the recognition that the disjuncture between these categories is the primal core of their existence. By temporarily placing elements in different ‘settings’ we can ‘zoom in on an element’ without losing the capacity to view the entire assemblage.

I am aware that categorization as a system unavoidably brings with it critical flaws. Firstly it entices the user to put every component of investigation into one of the defined categories, and is thus a form of anthropocentric reductionism (even without bringing to bear any of the affective arguments dealing with the abolition of the subject-object paradigm). Secondly, this act of categorization, the act of constructing an ‘exterior’, suggests that the ‘subject who is constructing the scheme’ cannot be placed in that scheme, or, in other words, that they possess objective exteriority. Creating a scheme is thus to remove oneself from the equation. Despite these flaws systems of categorization are, potentially, helpful, as long as we recognize that we only construct such systems in order to inspect the un-inspectable, as a starting point created because our topic of research falls outside existing classifications. In this way we might begin to look for the shadows cast and the contrasts produced by the elusive ‘object’ of our attention, our ‘Grey Mouse’, without ever being able to (or needing to) look it in the eye directly. Categories temporarily, therefore, become a means of seeing that which is currently unseen. In this context the temporality of a system is always under question; as we can only see the subject through its encounter with its environment, and as the environment changes by definition, the system can never be arrested in time. This a-temporal mechanism as a means of revealing I refer to as the bodiless shadow.

Mediascapes and Meta-Media

To return firmly to media we might consider Appadurai’s term: ‘mediascapes’. The central aim of Appadurai’s theory is to dislodge the Renaissance humanism central to the emergence of diasporic, nomadic and migrant socio-cultural fields, especially in relation to the projected and the imaginary. On recognizing the limits of this mode of thought, Appadurai formulates an agile terminology able to change perspective and to both re-contextualize and be re-contextualized. Of particular interest in this regard is the modus of information that is the gateway between the virtual and the actual, whereby the virtual is understood as the non-actualized part of reality, and both the actual and the virtual are part of reality.^[12] Appadurai expresses this modus through the term ‘mediascapes’, suggesting that the non-individual imagination leads (or contributes) to the emergence of a non-anthropocentric yet social force:

The image, the imagined, the imaginary – these are all terms that direct us to something critical and new in global cultural processes: the imagination as a social practice… The imagination is now central to all forms of agency, is itself a social fact, and is the key component of the new global order.^[13]

Here the notion of imagination is lifted, in the same manner as matter, to the level of the meta-individual (rather than the level of the intra-subjective). As literary critic Katherine Hayles notes:

Against [the] dream or nightmare of the body as information, what alternatives exist? We can see beyond this dream, I have argued, by attending to the material interfaces and technologies that make disembodiment such a powerful illusion. By adopting a double vision that looks simultaneously at the power of simulation and at the materialities that produce it, we can better understand the implications of articulating posthuman constructions together with embodied actualities.^[14]

The re-definition of mediascape that I propose here attempts to overcome these dilemmas by starting (and ending) in difference. Mediascape, here, is understood as the definitive domicile of forms of expression; it is through mediascape that information (which might appear also as a concept in the ideoscape or as content in the technoscape) resides, pulling all four scapes into the virtual and the actualized domain. Information here must not be seen in its most restricted sense; the absence of information is also information and information here can act dichotomously (when it appears here, it cannot be there, when it is there it had to have been here and so on). Keeping close the notion of the ethoscape (or, affect), this definition leads to an evaluation of information that ensures information is no longer reduced to its appearances in one of the ‘scapes’ alone. In fact we cannot even attempt to describe it through any single value, but rather information here is always seen as a multitude of ‘avatars’ shaped by its expression within a particular ‘scape’. In this way information becomes pure agency, not the agency of something, but agency full stop.^[15]

Information, therefore, lies in the concept of meta-media; it is meta-medial, not to be mistaken for cross-medial, trans-medial or multi-medial. In all of the latter categories the specificities of particular media are combined, connected and transposed to achieve a higher goal, to create to a stronger expression of communication. The specific denotation of meta-media I draw on here refers to media theorist Lev Manovich’s (the developer of the concept) description of meta-media as a field of new interactions between form and content in the field of emerging media and the convergence of technology and medium.^[16] Within this definition I would like to discuss a particular part of the meta-media system, namely the state that occurs when a certain concept, belief or idea is intensely present, to the extent that it dominates all other potential notions. This state of the ‘real virtual’, as opposed to virtual reality, saturates the mental-medium (the concept is often referred to in terms of highly volatile media, like ‘it is in the air’ or ‘out there in the ether’). This saturation is so ‘heavy’ that it can only be expressed through a particular medium, or, to be more precise, the virtual comes to demand some form of expression. At this point of saturation the virtual, overflowing with concept, is left with no option other than to crystalize in some type of medium: medium as the extension of man (effect), medium as substrate (capacities), medium as concretized sensation (expression), medium as entity (form), medium as force (agency) or medium as relation (becoming). Here, the elusive ‘grey mouse’ reappears; the expression of a concept through materialization, but a materialization conditioned by its surroundings and imminently affective.

To return to the issue raised at the beginning of this paper, we might, in this light, now ask: what is the affective capacity of a medium like urban-architecture, and what is the relationship between architecture as a materialization of a saturated concept and that concept? Here I will reaffirm a statement made above: the virtual and the actual are both reality. I have argued elsewhere that the relationship between the physical, the architecture of the tangible, and the architecture of affect have often been seen from a flawed perspective.^[17] Brian Massumi notes:

My starting point is the basic Spinozan definition of affect, which is an “ability to affect or be affected.” Right off the bat, this cuts transversally across a persistent division, probably the most persistent division. Because the ability to affect and the ability to be affected are two facets of the same event… You start in the middle, as Deleuze always taught, with the dynamic unity of an event.^[18]

Any research undertaken in which the initial premise was shaped by a perceived, fundamental difference between the architecture of the tangible and the architecture of affect, has, therefore, been overlooking one potentially provocative condition. The appearance of both types of architecture in the same conceptual field generally demands that one be subservient to the other; they are not of the same fabric and thus they cannot be equally strong. The question for this research should be whether this definition (type of defining even) of media or ‘types’ does not belong to a by-gone intellectual era. The classical definitions of media-typologies are based on properties gained as a result of their intrinsic qualities, in other words what photography is, is defined by the fact that it produces photographs, what the Polity of Moving Image produces, is defined by the fact that it produces moving images.^[19] In the contemporary ecology of media there is, in contrast, a constant interaction between media; media negotiate, share values, mediate protocols. It would immediately be more provocative to simply state, therefore, that both architectures (i.e. an architecture as tangible media and an architecture as affective media) are equal. There are still some fields were both types of media hold distinct value, but in architecture this is not necessarily the case, and it is provocative to explore the idea that these two values are not mutually exclusive. In this context the architectural ‘product’, if you will, is therefore no longer a product at all, it is an event, a transaction caught somewhere between the tangible and the affective.

Living in Media

Amidst the current techno-social avalanche, in which media transform into an amorphous, ubiquitous entity, it is perhaps not surprising to hear a cry for reconnection with the non-mediated, a desire for the lived incident. However, as noted above, the classical distinction between the lived and the mediated has become extremely opaque. If the act of relaying information has gained the same status as the production of information (tweet-retweet, post-repost), all incidents will be measured by one particular bandwidth, removing the fundamental gap between the lived and the mediated. Coupled with the collapse of models based on the separation of the tangible and the affective, or the agency of the individual, this transfer of essential values forces us to re-evaluate the position of the mediated in our society, and particularly the relationship between the lived experience and media.

As sociologist and philosopher Zygmunt Bauman notes in his description of what he terms liquid modernity:

Because today we don’t believe any more that the state of perfection may ever be reached – the change is here to stay. For the first time in our history, we are confronted with change as a permanent condition of human life. So we need to develop the ways of behavior [sic], the ways of contact which are fit for living in this state of constant change.^[20]

In response we could (for the time being) adopt media theorist Mark Deuze’s concept of a life lived not through, but in media. Here the alterity of all that is physical is subjugated to our individual perception and an assumed neutrality, and the closest we might come to a ‘moment of objectivity’ is through an accumulation of all mediated notions. Mark Deuze explains:

Media have come to be part of every aspect of people’s daily lives, facilitated by the worldwide proliferation of the internet and similar services that connect subscribers to a global, always-on digital information and communication network. The whole of the world and our lived experience in it can indeed be seen as framed by, mitigated through, and made immediate by pervasive and ubiquitous media. This world is what Roger Silverstone considers a ‘mediapolis’: a mediated public space where media underpin and overarch the experiences of everyday life.^[21]

Within this condition we could (re-)structure the interdependencies that traditionally appeared to have existed between the production and representation in and of moving imagery and urban conditions. We might also address the relationship between an individual and our means of engagement with a particular condition. Before the democratization of moving images it was possible to distinguish three qualities in which the Polity of Moving Image excelled: the fragmentation of time, the fragmentation of space and the fragmentation of memory. In this context we could define fragmentation as creating a whole by the collection of its fragments as opposed to defragmentation where we create the whole by assimilation. This differentiation appears subtle and perhaps insignificant, but this depends entirely on what we want to address. Just as the dérive was not about finding reality, Kino-Pravda was not about finding truth;^[22] both were a means of collecting. In both Kino-Pravda and the derive the (individual) player created a fundamental gap between player and game board, and thus abandoned all notions of objectivity.

A new approach, a dismantling of the artistic Tower of Babel to go with Vertov, seems necessary here to accommodate the collapse of distances between investigator and the investigated, whether it be the heroic cameraman or the meandering intellectual and the old city, and to address the re-atuned relationship between the virtual and the actual.^[23] As a tactical device, the dérive or drift was constructed to engage the discourse on social and cultural modernist conditions by re-entering a condition of “representational space” (as opposed to, using Lefebvre’s terms here, a condition of the “representation of space”).^[24] Aligning such techniques with methodologies developed and used by film-makers in the decennia after Guy Debord and the Situationists we might start to uncover a means to map socio-spatial-cultural-economic conditions in contemporary urban settings using moving imagery.

Take It To The Street

To give an example of such an approach I will here describe some research undertaken between 2004-2009 with small groups of post-graduate students at the faculty of architecture, Delft University of Technology.^[25] This research took place in two stages. In the first stage a group of students were asked to analyse sections of film to the point that they started to disintegrate (the film clips, not the students), meaning that every single layer in sound, pure image, framing, montage, and so on, was processed and counted, translated into tables and graphics. In effect they had extracted the shadow and discarded the body. On the basis of this data they were asked to remake the clip using different subjects, in this case urban architectures, before remaking the clip again by transforming it into an architectural form. This form, finally, was cast into concrete and subsequently as a character in a short film dealing with the architectural form itself. What these projects revealed was that not only were the results, the designs themselves, accomplished pieces of work, but also the students had discovered that it was useful to be able to dive in and out of this bundle of data, as it helped them to keep control of the design process and its underlying and overarching philosophy. They were able to design a new body, without any direct reference to the original, yet with the same ontological intensity.

In the second stage a second group of students were taught to be able to intelligently produce moving images before being sent out to a site for which they had to conceive a design intervention. These sites were specifically chosen on the basis of their social vulnerability and were often situated in hostile places from around the world. On arrival they had two missions. The first was to systematically analyse the site using a camera and following a set of pre-determined instructions. The second mission was to make a short film about the affective quality and the affective efficiency of the area and its inhabitants. This was not to be a documentary, nor an analysis, but a highly subjective sketch of the conditions they encountered. Upon their return these students were asked to develop this short film alongside the design for the intervention. At the conclusion of the project they revealed the two outputs simultaneously during one presentation (sometimes there were more outputs on display, such as written reports about the survey, video-stills and photographs). By not distinguishing between the two pre-set media the design of the film and the design of the architecture became one, as well as the research, the affection, the social and political conditions etc. In other words, they had started to create one bundle of information out of which several concrete media-products emerged; the various pieces were one and the same, different in shape yet iso-affective (of the same affectiveness) alterities. We had created the ´Grey Mouse´ itself, taking form and simultaneously casting shadows and forming contrasts in mediascape, ideoscape and technoscape; at once an architecture of affect and an architecture of tangibility.

Conclusion

It is time to rethink design strategies and models for perception, conception and affection. The notion of model itself is already vulnerable, as there is no input, nor output, but only throughput. In its place the process of research, concept, design, product should be conceived as one, a meta-medial framework, as an auto-charging field of conceptual saturation in the realm of the virtual, ready to discharge and be concretized in the actual. Research by design by research. While these notions are not yet mental models, they will become so as they inform and are reflected in the organization of the design process, and as the development and extrapolation of and through design projects feed back into this theoretical context. This feedback loop, therefore, alters not only the mediascape it may have evoked, but also all other scapes. To follow the militant psychotherapist and philosopher Félix Guattari:

The decisive factor, it seems to me, is the general inflexibility of social and psychological praxes - their failure to adapt - as well as a widespread incapacity to perceive the erroneousness of partitioning off the real into a number of separate fields. It is quite simply wrong to regard action on the psyche, the socius, and the environment as separate… we need to apprehend the world through the interchangeable lenses of the three ecologies.^[26]

The practice of research is – just as the theory of design – not to be arrested and forced into any pre-given form or methodology. Rather research through design, given its ability to address both the affective and the tangible equally, is the quintessential strategy to transform methodological limit into essential heuristic ingenuity. Through design-led research one can no longer think in terms of the specificity of a medium when looking at the affective capacity of that medium. One instead ought to explore the manner in which, as demonstrated above, this affective capacity (agency) might be revealed. This capacity might not be stable, but it is certainly concrete. The highest achievable goal here is to craft an intertwined dynamic field that creates an impression in ethoscape, mediascape, ideoscape and/or technoscape, aggregating meta-medial thought directly into the actualized object (to, as above, use the word carefully). Like the object of our research here, the research-by-design process is capable of casting a solid, if bodiless, shadow.


Published 24th September, 2015.


Notes

[01]  Chard, Nat. 2013. ‘Drawing Uncertainty’. Lecture at Plenitude and Emptiness: Symposium on Architectural Research by Design. Edinburgh, 4-6th October 2013, Friday 4th October.

[02]   Massumi, Brian. 2002. Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, p 195.

[03]  Massumi, Brian. 2002. Parables for the Virtual, p 27.

[04]  From foreword to Tincineto Clough, Patricia. 2007. The Affective Turn: Theorizing the Social. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

[05]  Deterritorializing in the Deleuzian sense.

[06]  ‘Naturecultures’ is a term coined by Donna Haraway in: Haraway, Donna. 2003. The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People and Significant Otherness. Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press.

[07]  The term ‘New Materialism’ was coined by Rosi Braidotti and Manuel DeLanda.

[08]  Dolphijn, Rick and Van der Tuin, Iris. 2012. New Materialism: Interviews & Cartographies. Michigan University Library: Open Humanities Press.

[09]  Bennett, Jane. 2010. Vibrant Matter, Durham, NC & London: Duke University Press.

[10]  Coole, Diana. 2010. ‘The Inertia of Matter and the Generativity of Flesh’, in New Materialism; Ontology, Agency, and Politics. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, p.107.

[11]  Appadurai, Arjun. 1996. Modernity at Large. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press, p.33.

[12]  Žižek, Slavoj. 2009. The Parallax View, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

[13]  Appadurai continues: “No longer mere fantasy (opium for the masses whose real work is somewhere else), no longer simple escape (from a world defined principally by more concrete purposes and structures), no longer elite pastime (thus not relevant to the lives of ordinary people), and no longer mere contemplation (irrelevant for new forms of desire and subjectivity), the imagination has become an organized field of social practices, a form of work (in the sense of both labor [sic] and culturally organized practice), and a form of negotiation between sites of agency (individuals) and globally defined fields of possibility. This unleashing of the imagination links the play of pastiche (in some settings) to the terror and coercion of states and their competitors.” Appadurai, Arjun. 1996. Modernity at Large, p.33.

[14]  Hayles, Katherine N. 1999. How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, p.47.

[15]  Just as affect, percept, and concept are, to use Spinoza’s term, proto-actions of affection, perception, conception etc.

[16]  Manovich, Lev. 2001. The Language of New Media, Cambridge, MA: MIT press. This is a reversal of Marshall McLuhan’s conception of meta-media as the totalizing effect of media. McLuhan, Marshal. 1964. Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man, London: Routledge.

[17]  Boumeester, Marc. 2011. ‘Reconsidering Cinematic Mapping: Halfway Between Collected Subjectivity and Projective Mapping’ in Francois Penz & Andong Lu (eds.), Urban Cinematics: Understanding Urban Phenomena through the Moving Image. Chicago: Intellect Press.

[18]  Expanding on these two ‘facets’ Massumi notes: “One face is turned towards what you might be tempted to isolate as an object, the other towards what you might isolate as a subject. Here, they are two sides of the same coin. There is an affectation, and it is happening in-between. You start with the in-betweenness [sic]. No need to detour through well-rehearsed questions of philosophical foundations in order to cobble together a unity.” Massumi interviewed by Joel McKim in “Micropolitics: Exploring Ethico-Aesthetics” in Inflexions: A Journal for Research-Creation, No 3, October 2009.

[19]  The polity of Moving Image is the entire system that produces moving images, including all economic, industrial, societal and creative components.

[20]  Bauman, Zygmunt. 2000. Liquid Modernity, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

[21]  Deuze, Mark. 2007. Media Works, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. pp.12-13. See: Silverstone, Roger. 2006. Media and Morality: On the Rise of the Mediapolis. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

[22]  Dérive: the exploration of urban landscapes fuelled by aesthetic instinct. Kino Pravda (film truth): a concept promoted by Dziga to capture fragments of actuality with the film camera, which – after editing - would reveal deeper layers of truth that could not be seen without the intervention of the camera and the system of montage.

[23]  In Vertov’s view, ‘art’s tower of Babel’ was the dominance of narrative over cinematic technique - in film theory also known as the Institutional Mode of Representation - which he saw as a direct threat to the construction of true cinema.

[24]  Lefebvre, Henri. 1991. The Production of Space, Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing.

[25]  Parts of this research have been described in Hauptman, Deborah and Akkerhuis, Bart (eds.). 2006. The Body in Architecture.  Rotterdam: 010 Publishers; and Penz, François and Lu, Andong (eds.). 2011. Urban Cinematics: Understanding urban phenomena through the moving image. Bristol: Intellect.

[26]  Guattari, Félix. 1989. The Three Ecologies in New formations, No.8 (Summer)

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